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I. INTRODUCTION
The question is straightforward: does California’s ban on campaign
1
contributions from lobbyists violate the First Amendment? The answer is not
straightforward. The purpose of this Comment is to assess the validity of
California’s ban on the changes made to campaign finance law by the Supreme
2
Court under Chief Justice John Roberts. The Chief Justice has authored several
decisions that diverted the course of campaign finance law through constitutional
3
interpretations that will likely overwhelm California’s justifications for the ban.
In 2000, California enacted Government Code § 85702, barring lobbyists
from contributing to an elected state officer or candidate for state office if the
4
lobbyist is registered to lobby the officer’s government agency. In 2001, the only
time § 85702 was litigated, the District Court for the Eastern District of
5
California found the ban to be constitutional on First Amendment grounds. The
plaintiffs did not appeal the decision, and the court’s ruling remains the only case
6
law on the ban.
Questioning the vitality of the ban is important because unrestricted political
7
speech is an indispensable element of democratic self-governance. At the end of
California’s 2015 legislative session, the state had nearly 1,800 registered
8
lobbyists. If the ban was challenged today, the outcome may be markedly
9
different. Since Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Supreme Court in 2005,
campaign finance limitations have been dramatically struck down as
10
unconstitutional. California’s voters enacted the ban near the end of the
Rehnquist Court, when decisions like Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2017; M.P.P.,
California State University Monterey Bay, 2011; B.A., Political Science, University of California, Davis, 2007;
A.A., English, Las Positas College, 2005. Foremost, much love to my family, my spouse Meghann and our
children Baylee and Abrielle, for supporting me throughout my academic career. Many thanks to the law review
editors for their help on this publication, and to Professor Nicolas Heidorn for his invaluable input on the
subject matter.
1. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2015).
2. Infra Part I.
3. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434 (2014).
4. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2015).
5. Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 (E.D.
CA 2001).
6. Id.
7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
8. Jim Miller, Number of California Lobbyists Grows Over Past Decade, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 11,
2015, 5:02 PM), available at http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article34953855.
html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
9. Infra Part V.
10. See Ann Southworth, The Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in the Roberts Court:
A Research Agenda, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2015) (describing the precedent-upsetting impact of
Citizens United and the less-appreciated holding of McCutcheon).
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and McConnell v. Federal Elections Committee stymied a broad threat of
corporate influence in elections and upheld restrictions on the political speech of
11
corporations. However, the Roberts Court overturned parts of Austin and
McConnell in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Committee and McCutcheon
v. Federal Elections Committee, downplaying the threat of potential corruption
12
caused by corporate monies in elections. If challenged today, California’s ban
on lobbyist campaign contributions would likely be held unconstitutional as an
overbroad restriction that neither respects lobbyists’ personal political interests,
13
nor responds to threats of actual or perceived corruption.
Part II of this Comment presents background information on campaign
14
contribution bans. Part II opens with a review of different forms of absolute
15
bans and why the bans were upheld or struck down. Decisions addressing bans
on contributions from federal contractors, minors, and foreign nationals are used
16
17
as illustrations. Part II discusses the background on lobbyist contribution bans.
A descriptive legislative history of California’s ban is provided, as well as brief
18
surveys about similar bans in other states. The other states’ bans and related
19
case law are provided as a comparative study for best (and worst) practices.
Finally, Part II concludes with a review of Alaska’s ban on campaign
contributions by lobbyists except for contributions to candidates that the lobbyist
20
may vote for. Alaska’s model is proposed as a possible alternative to
21
California’s current ban.
Part III of the Comment surveys the shifting judicial precedent of campaign
22
finance challenges. Prior to Chief Justice Roberts, the Court tended to vote 5-4
in favor of contribution limitations; however, the Court shifted under Roberts,
23
tending to vote 5-4 against limitations. The first section of Part III reviews

11. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (finding the state’s authority to
regulate a corporation’s independent expenditures was justified because the corporate structure allowing wealth
accumulation was conferred by the state), and McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 137-42,
153–54 (2003) (applying the “closely drawn” standard of review, the Court found Congress’ conclusion that
corruption is broader than quid pro quo transactions).
12. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434 (2014).
13. Infra Part V.
14. Infra Part II.
15. Infra Part II.
16. Infra Part II.
17. Infra Part II.
18. Infra Part II.
19. Infra Part II.
20. Infra Part II.
21. Infra Part II.
22. Infra Part III.
23. Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but
with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2015-70 at 5,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2639902 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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24

relevant pre-Roberts Supreme Court authority. This section includes an analysis
of the standards of review applied by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo and what
25
factors influence the Court’s level of scrutiny. The second section of Part III
assesses the current trend against campaign finance limitations promulgated by
26
the Roberts’ court. The third section of Part III explores the Roberts Court’s use
of the avoidance doctrine and how the Court seems to offer “one last chance”
27
before issuing a significant change of law. The fourth and final section of Part
III reviews relevant campaign finance decisions from the 9th Circuit and focuses
28
on the Circuit’s adoption and interpretation of Citizens United.
29
Part IV analyzes limits on nonresident campaign contributions. This Part is
30
relatively short due to the dearth of scholarship on the issue. Case law suggests
that limiting nonresident campaign contributions is only appropriate when nongeographic factors increase the likelihood that the contribution may be
31
corruptive.
32
Part V proposes to revise California’s ban on lobbyist contributions. This
Part opens by exposing constitutional and practical infirmities with the ban’s
33
current implementation. The ban will be highlighted as an ineffective
prophylactic because of an ironic development—lobbyists prefer the ban because
34
elected officials do not hassle them for contributions. This Part proposes to
35
reform the ban to be more similar to Alaska’s limitation. Prohibiting lobbyists
from contributing to any candidate except those the lobbyist may vote for is a
respectful balance between preventing corruption and protecting First
36
Amendment rights.
II. BACKGROUND ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS & BANS
Political operatives are using the perceived negative effects of Citizens
37
United on California’s campaign finance regulations to drive electoral turnout.
24. Infra Part III.
25. Infra Part III.
26. Infra Part III.
27. Infra Part III.
28. Infra Part III.
29. Infra Part IV.
30. Infra Part IV.
31. Vannatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 157–58
(2d Cir. 2002).
32. Infra Part V.
33. Infra Part V.
34. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 618 (Alaska 1999).
35. Infra Part V.
36. Infra Part V.
37. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, ‘Citizens United’ advisory measure can go on ballot, California high court
says, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), available at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-californiasupreme-court-ballot-20160104-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting
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Even Justice Anthony Kennedy, the author of Citizens United, lamented that the
campaign finance reform anticipated by the Court is “not working the way it
38
should.” The corruptive influence of money in politics prompted limitations to
39
campaign contributions. And these limits are constitutionally-justified as a
40
legitimate means to combat actual and perceived quid pro quo corruption. This
Part is divided into four sections: the first covers absolute bans; the second,
temporal bans; the third surveys state-level bans on lobbyist contributions; and
41
the fourth is an in-depth analysis of Alaska’s lobbyist contribution ban.
42
Alaska’s ban serves as the model for the revisions to California’s ban.
A. Absolute Bans on Campaign Contributions
The Supreme Court’s vigorous protection of free speech principles extends to
43
campaign contributions. The Court is more likely to strike down absolute bans
44
on contributions than it is to strike down a mitigated contribution limitation. In
McConnell, the Court found a ban on contributions from minors to be
45
unconstitutional. The Court did not accept the government’s assertions that
minors should not be allowed to contribute simply because minors could serve as
46
a conduit for parents to circumvent contributions limits. Absolute bans are
47
generally upheld when matters of sovereign importance are at stake.
B. Temporal Bans on Campaign Contributions
To reduce the occurrence or appearance of corruption, a dozen states have
banned legislators and candidates from receiving campaign contributions while
48
the state legislature is in session. These bans typically prohibit legislators from

that a Citizens United-specific ballot measure would fan Democratic voter turnout because of the opinion’s
polarizing effect).
38. Supreme Court Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy visits HLS, YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHbMPnA5n0Q (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
39. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
40. Id.
41. Infra Part II.A–C.
42. Infra Part II.D.
43. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
44. McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126–27 (2003).
45. Id. at 231–33.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 793 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding ban on
contributions from federal contractors on the basis that the government’s administration needs to be seen as
impartial); Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp.2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding a ban on
contributions from foreign nationals).
48. ALA. CODE § 17-5-7(b)(2) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-35 (2015); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 430/540 (2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-9-2-12 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(Q) (2015); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC.
LAW § 13-235 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294A.300 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-34.1 (2015); TEX.
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accepting contributions during the legislative session, as well as thirty to sixty
49
days before and after the legislative session.
These temporal bans are easily subverted in practice and difficult to defend
50
in litigation. State-level bans are preempted by the Federal Election Campaign
51
Act (FECA) and do not apply to federal elections held in the state. FECA’s
preemptive force causes a conundrum—during a legislative session, a state
legislator cannot accept contributions for reelection, but the legislator can accept
52
contributions for Congressional election. When litigated, the temporal bans are
53
typically found to be unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. The
restriction on free speech caused by temporal bans has been deemed
54
unconstitutional when the ban is applied to both incumbents and candidates and
55
also when applied only to incumbents. Temporal bans are upheld when the ban
56
is limited to a qualified group of contributors. Thus, the narrowness of a ban
57
directly correlates with the likelihood that the ban will be upheld.
C. Bans on Lobbyist Contributions
Over a dozen states implemented limits on campaign contributions from
58
lobbyists to public officials. These limits are designed to stave corruption, and

ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.034 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-954 (2015);
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.560 (2015).
49. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294A.300 (2015) (barring contributions and solicitations from 30
days before to 30 days after a regular session).
50. See Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 722 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (finding a temporal ban equally
affecting legislators and non-incumbent challengers to be unconstitutional as a method that was not the least
restrictive means of preventing corruption or its appearance), and Arkansas Right to Life State PAC v. Butler,
29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (finding a temporal ban to be unconstitutional because it barred
small and large contributions alike despite “only large contributions pos[ing] a threat of corruption.”).
51. 52 U2.S.C. § 30143 (2015).
52. See, e.g., Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 999 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that FECA preempts state law
on the matter of campaign contributions to federal campaigns), and Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 1992-43 (Jan.
28, 1993) (explaining the FEC’s opinion that FEC regulation on FECA preempts state law on the matter of
contributions to federal campaigns).
53. Trout v. State, 231 S.W.3d 140, 140 (Mo. 2007).
54. Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714, 722–23 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
55. Arkansas Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
56. North Carolina Right to Life v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th. Cir 1999).
57. Id.
58. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2015); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2015); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1-45-105.5 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-610 (2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.504
(2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4153a (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.1
§ 1015(3) (2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.273 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.13B (2015); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §187.1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-80 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 266(3) (2015); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 13.625 (2015).
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59

they benefit lobbyists and legislators alike. In states that allow lobbyists to
contribute to legislators, lobbyists believe that failing to make contributions
60
adversely affects their performance. Their performance is affected by their
61
potential loss of access to the legislator. Legislators benefit from the ban if the
62
public’s perception of a corrupt atmosphere in the legislature is diminished.
Most states that ban lobbyist contributions to legislators and other public
63
officials temporally limit the ban to apply only during the legislative session.
64
Temporal lobbyist contribution bans from Vermont and North Carolina were
65
both upheld. These bans were upheld specifically because the temporal limits
did not absolutely prohibit lobbyists from contributing to legislators and public
66
officials. The bans were found to be constitutional because their impact was
67
narrowed to “avoid a serious appearance of impropriety” and covered only “that
period during which the risk of an actual quid pro quo or the appearance of one
68
runs highest.”
69
Other states, however, do not temporally limit the lobbyist contribution ban.
Like California, lobbyists in Kentucky and South Carolina are completely barred
70
from making contributions to legislators. However, unlike California’s ban, the
bans in Kentucky and South Carolina have not been litigated. The 2nd Circuit
held Connecticut’s statute banning lobbyist contributions unconstitutional in
71
2010. The 2nd Circuit found that fear of the prospect of quid pro quo corruption
72
was not a sufficient state interest to abridge First Amendment rights.
59. See, e.g., State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 618 (Alaska 1999) (explaining why
lobbyists are pressured to contribute), and Green Party v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d. 298, 308 (D. Conn. 2009)
(explaining why the legislature’s optics are improved by a ban on lobbyist contributions).
60. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 618.
61. Id.
62. Green Party v. Garfield, 648 F.Supp.2d at 308.
63. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2015) (barring the acceptance of contributions during
the regular legislative session except for those received during the first three days of the session postmarked
before the first day of the session), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.1 § 1015(3) (2015) (barring contributions
“during any period of time in which the Legislature is convened before final adjournment,” except for
contributions relating to special elections).
64. Kimbell v. Hooper, 164 Vt. 80, 80 (1995).
65. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999).
66. Kimbell v. Hooper, 164 Vt. at 91 (1995); North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705,
716 (1999).
67. Kimbell v. Hooper, 164 Vt. at 91.
68. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716.
69. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (2015) (barring the acceptance of contributions from
lobbyists, but allowing the legislator a complete defense if the legislator returns the donation within 30 days of
acceptance and then duly informs the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 217-80 (2015) (barring lobbyists from giving campaign contributions to legislators, except for “emergency
assistance given gratuitously and in good faith” and “anything of value given to a family member for love and
affection.”).
70. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.767 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-80 (2015).
71. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 2010).
72. Id. at 207 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
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D. Alaska Model
Alaska bans lobbyists from making campaign contributions except to those
73
candidates the lobbyist could vote for in the relevant state election. For
example, a lobbyist living in downtown Juneau, who is represented by Alaska
74
House of Representatives District 33 and Senate District Q, could contribute
75
only to candidates of those two districts. Theoretically, if the lobbyist planned to
move and reside in a new district before an election, the lobbyist could contribute
76
to the candidates in both the current and anticipated districts.
Alaska’s ban became effective in 1997, and the Alaska Civil Liberties Union
(AKCLU) promptly challenged it as an unconstitutional infringement of
77
associational freedoms under the First Amendment. The AKCLU argued that a
lobbyist could not corrupt a legislator with a contribution because individual
78
contributions were limited at no more than $500 for legislative campaigns. The
79
AKCLU did not challenge the ban on equal protection grounds.
In upholding the ban, the Supreme Court of Alaska found it to be “a logical
compromise between lobbyists’ private rights and their professional
80
obligations.” The Court emphasized how the “special role” of lobbyists in the
legislative process gives rise to perceived corruption when lobbyists contribute to
81
a large number of legislators. Lobbyists, the Court reasoned, must contribute
82
broadly to protect their professional interests.
But, the Court also reasoned that lobbyists are people too, with private rights
83
and political interests deserving of protection. Alaska’s Supreme Court upheld
the ban because it found the allowance for in-district contributions to be a
tailored recognition that the perception of corruption ends when professional
84
interests fail to outweigh personal interests. The Supreme Court of the United
85
States denied the petition for a writ of certiorari for this case.

73. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.13.074(g) (West 2015).
74. Alaska Division of Elections, Proclamation of Redistricting (July 14, 2013).
75. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 15.13.074(g) (West 2015).
76. Id. (“[T]he individual may make a contribution under this section to a candidate for the legislature in a
district in which the individual is eligible to vote or will be eligible to vote on the date of the election.”).
77. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 618 (Alaska 1999).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 619.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 619–620.
85. Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 528 U.S. 1153, 1157 (2000).
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Litigation involving campaign contribution bans and First Amendment
questions are generally reviewed under the “closely drawn” standard
86
promulgated in Buckley v. Valeo. Contribution bans and limitations are
87
evaluated under different levels of scrutiny within the “closely drawn” standard.
In one case involving California’s ban on lobbyist contributions, the Court found
the ban narrowly tailored because the prohibition only applied if the lobbyist was
88
registered to lobby the office of the candidate or incumbent.
The Court’s analyses of First Amendment challenges to campaign finance
restrictions are rooted in Buckley. Buckley’s import cannot be dismissed despite
vocal opposition that Buckley “denigrates core First Amendment speech and
89
should be overruled.” Buckley established different levels of review for
independent expenditures and contributions, a distinction akin to “two sides of
90
the same First Amendment coin.” The Roberts Court slowly narrowed the
distinction by preserving the protections afforded to expenditures and reviewing
91
contribution limitations with a greater level of scrutiny.
A. Pre-Roberts Precedent
Buckley’s effect on the lobbyist contribution ban is found in a gradient of
92
distinctions. Campaign expenditures are the most protected form of campaign
93
speech because they represent “the quantity of expression.” Campaign
contributions are less protected because the speech is a symbolic gesture of
94
support. The Roberts Court is aware that the symbolic nature of contributions
95
dampers the constitutional concerns raised by contribution Limitations.
Contribution limits that jeopardize a person’s associational freedoms are more
96
likely to withstand First Amendment scrutiny than content-based restrictions.

86. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
87. Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 US 146, 162 (2003).
88. Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190–91
(E.D. CA 2001).
89. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring).
90. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Richard L. Hasen, Die Another Day - The Supreme Court takes a big step closer to gutting the last
bits of campaign finance reform, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/04/the_subtle_awfulness_of_the_mccutcheon_v_fec_campaign_finance_deci
sion_the.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
92. Infra Part III.A.
93. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
94. Id. at 21.
95. Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 US 146, 162-63 (2003).
96. Id.
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Because contribution limits affect associational freedoms, a more lenient
97
“closely drawn” standard of review is employed to assess contribution limits.
The Roberts Court invited interpretations that general characteristics of the
98
affected contributors may inform the “closely drawn” standard. As an initial
inquiry, the contributor’s person must be examined for suspect characteristics
99
that justify a ban. That is, is the ban in place because of a threatening
characteristic of the lobbyist as a person, or because the lobbyist is compensated
100
for direct advocacy? Once the relational aspect of the ban and the lobbyist is
confirmed, then the ban must be assessed under the appropriate level of judicial
101
scrutiny.
The contributor’s personhood is a crucial threshold inquiry when determining
102
the constitutionality of campaign contribution bans. If the person has a
compromising characteristic that allows the government more leeway to restrict
103
the person’s rights, then it is more likely that a ban will be upheld. For
example, in Bluman v. Federal Elections Commission, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s decision, which found bans on contributions from
104
foreign nationals to be constitutional. The district court in Bluman emphasized
that foreign citizens may be denied privileges granted to U.S. citizens, especially
those privileges “intimately related to the processes of democratic self105
government.” And in Wagner v. Federal Elections Commission, the D.C. Court
of Appeals found a ban on contributions from U.S. citizens hired as federal
106
contractors to be constitutional. The Court in Wagner relied on precedent,
which permitted greater restriction of speech for government employees than the
107
public at large.

97. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2015).
98. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456–57 (2014) (vacillating on whether
fit should be reasonable or perfect and admitting that the appropriate scope depends on the interest served).
99. See, e.g, Bluman v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 283–285 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding a
ban on federal contributions from foreign nationals), and Wagner v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 793 F.3d 1, 10–12
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding a ban on federal contributions from federal contractors).
100. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57 (noting how the ends may justify the means if the end is
appropriate).
101. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345–346 (1995) (detailing how the issue
being litigated must be assessed to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny).
102. See Bluman, 800 F.Supp.2d at 283–85 (explaining why contributions from foreign nationals to
election campaigns are barred by federal statute while those same persons may contribute to issue advocacy
causes).
103. See Wagner, 793 F.3d at 10–12 (explaining the history of federal employment-based campaign
contribution limits and bans).
104. Bluman v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 132 S.Ct. 1087, 1087 (2015).
105. Bluman v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 287–88 (D.D.C. 2011).
106. Wagner v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 793 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
107. Id.
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B. Roberts Court’s Granular Scrutiny for Contributions
In 2003’s FEC v. Beaumont, the last major campaign finance case before
Roberts joined the Court, the Court articulated that both contribution bans and
108
limitations were scrutinized at the same “closely drawn” standard of review.
The Court held that bans and limitations are not treated differently because they
109
both address the same political activity—campaign contributions. Justice
Thomas, writing in dissent and joined by Justice Scalia, flatly argued that any
campaign finance law should be subject to strict scrutiny and any “broad
110
prophylactic caps” on contributions are unconstitutional.
In 2005, during Roberts’ confirmation hearings, Senator Sam Brownback
pointedly asked Roberts whether it was odd that some campaign contribution
111
restrictions were upheld as unconstitutional and others were not. Roberts
demurred, “ . . . political speech is generally regarded as at the core of what the
First Amendment was designed to protect, and some of the other speeches is
not. . . . [W]hether the particular cases were correctly decided or not is not
112
something I feel is appropriate for me to discuss.” Now that Roberts is on the
113
Court, he has made it clear that he believes some cases were wrongly decided.
In 2010, in Citizens United, the Court refused to conflate expenditures and
114
contributions. The Court also refused to “reconsider whether contribution limits
115
should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.” However, the
116
rationales in Citizens United undercut Beaumont’s strong holding. For example,
117
Citizens United incorporated part of Justice Scalia’s dissent from Austin,
holding that the state’s act of conferring advantages to persons or corporations
118
does not then allow the state to prohibit speech of that person or corporation.
Additionally, Citizens United clarified and narrowed the sufficient
119
government interest in quid pro quo arrangements. The government’s interest
lies in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, not in preventing
120
the appearance of influence or access to elected officials. Although Citizens
United seemingly undercut the strong holding in Beaumont, the Court has denied
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Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 US 146, 162–63 (2003).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 165.
S. HRG. 109–158, 395 (2005).
Id.
Hasen, supra note 23, at 6.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
Id. at 359.
Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F. 3d 864, n.12 (8th Cir. 2012).
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351.
US v. Danielczyk, 683 F. 3d 611, 618 (4th Cir. 2012).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
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certiorari for two cases attempting to overturn Beaumont by way of Citizens
121
United.
In 2014, the Supreme Court’s McCutcheon decision came close to
eviscerating Beaumont by requiring a more rigorous standard of review, but
Justice Thomas concurred only in judgment and did not join Roberts’ opinion,
122
leading to a 4-1-4 decision. McCutcheon sidestepped resolving the different
standards of review for expenditures and contributions; instead, it focused on the
123
law’s fit relative to the government’s stated objective. The Court reframed the
appropriate fit and effectively gave rise to a more demanding level of review: “if
a law that restricts political speech does not ‘avoid unnecessary abridgement’ of
124
First Amendment rights it cannot survive ‘rigorous’ review.” McCutcheon’s
emphasis on fit strikes directly at Beaumont’s holding that a contributor “cannot
125
prevail, then, simply by arguing that a ban . . . is bad tailoring.” The Court later
admitted to deliberately avoiding the question of the proper standard of review in
126
McCutcheon. The Court chose to “assume, without deciding, that a law is
127
subject to a less stringent level of scrutiny. . . .” The Roberts Court’s decision
to purposely avoid deciding the proper standard of review in McCutcheon is
128
perplexing but not surprising. As explained in the next section, the Roberts
129
Court seems to prefer legislative fixes over judicial activism.
C. Would the Roberts Court Avoid a Decision on the Constitutionality of
California’s Ban on Lobbyist Contributions?
The “avoidance canon” is a traditional interpretative canon that “encourages
a court to adopt one of several plausible interpretations of a statute in order to
130
avoid deciding a tough constitutional question.” The Supreme Court used the
canon as a diplomatic tool to allow Congress to fix a problematic statute through
the legislative process rather than finding the statute to be technically

121. Iowa Right to Life v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1787, (2014);
U.S. v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1459 (2013).
122. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1464 (2014).
123. Id. at 1445–46.
124. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
125. Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003).
126. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2015).
127. Id.
128. Infra Part II.C.
129. Infra Part II.C.
130. Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance By the Roberts Court, 1 SUP. CT.
REV. 181, 181–82 (2009).
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131

unconstitutional. The Court’s willingness to engage—rather than provoke—
132
Congress is consistent with the Court’s stated disfavor of facial challenges.
An emerging pattern of the Roberts Court shows the Chief’s willingness to
tackle facial challenges after the Court signals a “one last chance” to fix the
133
constitutional infirmity. Relevant here, for example, is the downfall of § 203 of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended FECA
§ 316(b)(2) to ban corporate entities from using general treasury funds for
134
independent expenditures and electioneering communications. In the 2003
McConnell decision, the pre-Roberts Court upheld the facial constitutionality of
135
FECA § 316(b)(2) as amended by BCRA § 203. The Court deferred to
Congress’s discretion, relying on the legislative history of § 203 to find that
Congress knew “corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual
torrent of [ads] . . . and that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow
136
of money.” However, the McConnell decision did not foreclose as-applied
137
challenges to the constitutionality of BCRA § 203.
In 2006, BCRA § 203 came under attack again, but this time before the
138
Roberts Court in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II). WRTL II involved
another challenge to the constitutionality of BCRA § 203 and the holding in
139
McConnell. Rather than upsetting BCRA and the precedent in McConnell, the
Court avoided a facial constitutional challenge by finding that BCRA § 203 was
140
unconstitutional as applied. The 5-4 opinion examples the “one last chance”
doctrine of the Roberts Court, hinting that McConnell may be overturned if
141
BCRA § 203 is subject to another facial challenge.
The 2010 Citizens United decision addressed the facial challenge to BCRA
142
§ 203 four years after McConnell. The Citizens United decision overruled the
143
basis for McConnell and, thus, found BCRA § 203 could not be upheld. The

131. Neal Devins, Constitutional Avoidance and The Roberts Court, 32 DAYTON L. REV. 339, 339
(2007).
132. See Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)
(explaining that facial challenges usually rest on speculation, are contrary to judicial restraint, and frustrate the
democratic process); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006)
(explaining the frustration caused by facial invalidation and why partial invalidation better respects the intent of
elected representatives).
133. Richard Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 173, 174–175 (2014).
134. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155 (2002).
135. McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003).
136. Id. at 207.
137. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006) (per curiam).
138. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 449–50 (2006).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 481.
141. Id. at 482.
142. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010).
143. Id. at 365–66.
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ominous warnings in WRTL II spelled certain doom for McConnell and BCRA
144
§ 203.
As discussed earlier, the Court in McCutcheon chose to “assume, without
145
deciding, that a law is subject to a less stringent level of scrutiny. . . .” Viewed
through the lens of “one last chance,” the Court’s purposeful and avowed
146
avoidance of deciding the necessity of a higher level of scrutiny is telling.
Justice Scalia, no fan of giving Congress one last chance to fix infirm legislation,
147
called the practice “faux judicial restraint.”
But if the Court was primed to require a higher level of scrutiny for
contribution limits, Justice Scalia’s unexpected passing may have stopped the
148
momentum. Justice Scalia’s notorious originalist principles are apparent in his
campaign finance opinions where he distinguished himself as a thought leader for
reformers and opponents because of his opposition to campaign finance
149
deregulation and his support of enhanced campaign disclosures. A stalwart for
deregulating campaign finance limits, Justice Scalia believed that the First
150
Amendment does not discriminate against speakers or types of speech. As a
champion of campaign finance disclosures, he intimated that the only thing better
151
than more speech was more truthful speech. Justice Scalia joined the majority
in McConnell, WRTL II, and Citizens United, and the plurality in McCutcheon,
four decisions that primed the Court to apply strict scrutiny for campaign
152
contributions.
D. 9th Circuit Precedent
The Roberts Court slowly moved campaign finance law to the right, and the
153
shift in policy is being embraced by California and the 9th Circuit. The 9th
144. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 482–83 (Alito, J., concurring), and FEC v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 498–99 (Scalia, J., concurring); also Re, supra note 133, at 176.
145. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2015).
146. Re, supra note 133, at 176.
147. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at n.7.
148. Bob Bauer, Justice Scalia and Campaign Finance: A Puzzle, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Feb.
17, 2016), available at http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2016/02/justice-scalia-campaign-finance-onepuzzle/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
149. Id.
150. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 392–93 (2010).
151. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 382 (1995).
152. McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449 (2006); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and McCutcheon v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
153. See, e.g., Lair v. Bullock, 787 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2015) (adopting the Citizens United holding);
Maura Dolan, California’s high court appears ready to allow voters to weigh in on Citizens United, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 6, 2015), available at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-citizens-united-ballot20151006-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (California’s legislature
recognizes the import of Citizens United and requested a ballot initiative to gauge voters’ opinion of a
constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United).
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Circuit employs a synthesized test to gauge the validity of campaign contribution
154
limits. Using the Court’s precedent from Buckley and its progeny, the 9th
Circuit developed the Eddleman test in 2003:
“[S]tate campaign contribution limits will be upheld if (1) there is
adequate evidence that the limitation furthers a sufficiently important
state interest, and (2) if the limits are closely drawn—i.e., if they (a)
focus narrowly on the state’s interest, (b) leave the contributor free to
affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficient
155
resources to wage an effective campaign.”
Per Eddleman, the only sufficiently important state interests are the
156
prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption. Eddleman allows the
interests to be broadly manifested, including the appearance of officials being
157
The improper
“too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”
compliance could be demonstrated by the contributors’ access to or influence
158
over the politician.
Finding corruption where access and influence are prevalent is problematic
159
because there is no way to quantify how much access or influence is improper.
In Citizens United, the Court held that only the prevention of quid pro quo
corruption was a sufficiently important state interest in preventing corruption or
160
its appearance. The Court expressly rejected the proposition that the First
Amendment would allow a contribution limitation to further the state’s interest in
161
limiting a contributor’s access or influence.
Citizens United is squarely at odds with the Eddleman standard of allowing a
162
limitation of access or influence as a sufficiently important state interest. The
effect of Citizens United on Eddleman’s campaign contribution analysis is
apparent in light of Citizens United’s effect on independent expenditure
163
limitations. The 9th Circuit and other circuit courts recognized Citizens
United’s narrowing effect on the analysis for a sufficiently important state
164
interest in the context of independent expenditures. Independent expenditures
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Mont. Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000)).
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Id. at 360.
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163. Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 694 (9th Cir. 2010).
164. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2011); Long Beach Area Chamber
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are purportedly not corrupting because they are neither given to nor controlled by
165
the candidate. A tenuous link between independent expenditures and candidates
166
makes it less likely that corruption would arise from the expenditure.
Campaign contributions are a far more direct way to influence candidates
than independent expenditures because candidates may direct the expenditure of
167
campaign funds. The 9th Circuit found Citizens United abrogated Eddleman’s
“important state interest” analysis because hampering influence was no longer
168
recognized as a sufficient state interest. Although decreasing the influence of
donors cannot be a sufficient state interest to justify a contribution limitation, a
sufficient interest can be found by reframing a limitation as a means to prevent
169
corruption.
IV. THE NARROW CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR LIMITING NONRESIDENT
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
Limiting nonresident campaign contributions is acceptable in narrow
circumstances where non-geographic factors increase the likelihood that the
170
nonresident’s contribution may be corruptive. This section presents a current
dispute over nonresident limitations in Austin, Texas, and then explains how the
171
loss of the anti-distortion rationale severely jeopardizes nonresident limitations.
The City of Austin restricts the aggregate amount of campaign contributions
to city council candidates from persons living in a postal zip code outside of city
172
limits. Austin’s restriction on nonresident contributions has been challenged as
an unconstitutional burden on associational freedom that fails to advance a
173
cognizable quid pro quo interest. The case, Zimmerman v. City of Austin, went
174
to trial in December 2015 and is awaiting a decision. Austin’s defense of the
nonresident restriction relies on oblique reasoning: the city cites to a finding in
the voting rights case Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa that, “our cases have

165. Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1119.
166. Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696.
167. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450–51 (2014).
168. Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2015).
169. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011).
170. Vannatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998), Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 157–158
(2d Cir. 2002).
171. Infra Part IV.
172. Austin City Charter, art. III § 8(A)(3).
173. Complaint, Zimmerman v. Austin, 24–25, July 27, 2015 (Civ. Case No. 15-628) (W.D. Tex.).
174. Lilly Rockwell, Zimmerman’s lawsuit over Austin fundraising rules heads to court, THE AMERICAN
STATESMAN (Dec. 13, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/local/zimmermans-lawsuitover-austin-fundraising-rules-h/nphy6/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to
175
participate in its political processes to those who reside within its borders.”
But the justification for the finding in Holt Civic Club undermines its benefit
176
as a defense in Zimmerman. The Court premised its finding in Holt Civic Club
on the need for a bright line rule to determine when voters could be enfranchised
177
in a municipal election. The Court found that predictable boundaries better
served the public’s interest than voting rights for nonresidents potentially
178
affected by municipal elections. In Zimmerman, the City of Austin’s failure to
absolutely prohibit nonresident contributions effectively favored earlier
179
contributors whose contributions fall below the aggregate cap. Additionally, at
dispute in Holt Civic Club were Fourteenth Amendment voter
disenfranchisement concerns—the “talismanic significance” of geographic
180
boundaries in voting cases has no direct bearing on First Amendment disputes.
The City of Austin may have cited to Holt Civic Club because, based on
more analogous cases, it is unlikely that the City of Austin’s geographic ban will
withstand constitutional scrutiny because such bans are usually justified on anti181
distortion grounds. In Whitmore v. FEC, a Green Party congressional candidate
claimed that her competitors’ acceptance of out-of-state contributions endangered
182
the home state’s republican government. The 9th Circuit found no sufficient
state interest in insulating a state government from out-of-state interests because
the First Amendment does not allow tempering the speech of one faction to
183
enhance the speech of a competing faction. A few years later, the 9th Circuit
confirmed that protecting a republican form of government is an insufficient state
184
interest.
In Vannatta v. Keisling, Oregon used this interest to justify a ban on out-of185
district contributions. Oregon also justified the ban as a necessary means to
186
prevent corruption. Importantly, the 9th Circuit failed to find that out-of-district
contributions could not be adequately corrupting to give rise to a sufficient state
187
interest. Bans on out-of-district contributions may be found sufficiently

175. Defendant’s Post Trial-Response Brief, (No. 1:15-cv-628-LY) (Feb. 1, 2016), citing Holt Civic Club
v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978).
176. Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1978).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Austin City Charter, art. III § 8(A)(3).
180. Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 81.
181. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (concluding the antidistortion rationale to be an “unconvincing and insufficient” state interest).
182. Whitmore v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 68 F.3d 1212, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995).
183. Id. at 1216.
184. Vannatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1221.
187. Id.
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“closely drawn to advance the goal of preventing corruption” if the contributions
188
can be distinguished by a “factor that would tend to indicate corruption.” The
9th Circuit struck down Oregon’s ban because the ban’s prevention of corrupt
189
and non-corrupt contributions was too broad.
Vermont also attempted to damper the influence of out-of-state contributions,
but did so by limiting the total amount of such contributions to 25 percent of a
190
campaign’s total contributions. Vermont’s use of a limitation rather than a ban
followed the finding in Vannatta v. Keisling that geographic bans must be
191
narrowed by a factor indicative of corruption. Vermont claimed the 25 percent
limitation was a necessary prophylactic against excessively large out-of-state
192
contributions inundating state campaigns. And the state’s interest in limiting
193
the size of large contributions is a bedrock defense against corruption. But
194
Vermont’s ban did not necessarily limit large out-of-state contributions. Once
the 25 percent was met, all additional contributions were banned, including
195
small, non-corrupt out-of-state contributions. The ban on over-the-threshold
contributions was held unconstitutional because it did nothing to prevent actual
196
or perceived corruption.
Interestingly, similar to Vermont, Alaska limits out-of-state contributions to
197
10 percent of total contributions. The Alaska Supreme Court upheld Alaska’s
nonresident limitation in the same 1999 case that upheld Alaska’s lobbyist
198
contribution ban. The nonresident limitation was explicitly upheld using anti199
distortion principles alone. Alaska’s limitation may be in jeopardy since antidistortion principles are no longer recognized as a sufficient basis for
200
contribution limitations. The First Amendment does not protect contribution
201
limits that discriminate based on geography alone. However, a state may
permissibly limit nonresident contributions if such limits are adequately justified
202
on an additional, corruptive characteristic.
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V. TAILORING CALIFORNIA’S LOBBYIST BAN TO SURVIVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE
California’s voters passed a large political reform package with 2000’s
203
Proposition 34 that included the ban on lobbyist contributions. The proponents
of Proposition 34 declared an objective “[t]o reduce the influence of large
contributors with an interest in matters before state government by prohibiting
204
lobbyist contributions.” The ban on lobbyist contributions was not the hallmark
205
of Proposition 34, and the Proposition was not introduced to combat a spate of
206
quid pro quo scandals. But the district court’s decision to uphold the ban
echoed the expressed purpose of diminishing lobbyist’s influence over
207
politicians. The ban’s oblique inclusion in the proposition and the overemphasis on reducing lobbyist influence severely weaken the ban’s constitutional
208
defenses.
A. Constitutional and Practical Infirmities of the Ban
209

California’s ban suffers from constitutional and practical infirmities. The
210
ban lacks a sufficient state interest to justify its enforcement. And it’s woeful
211
tailoring leaves it vulnerable to attack. In some circumstances, corruption can
212
seep in through the ban’s porous loopholes. The three infirmities are discussed
213
in the following sections.

203. Text of Proposed LawCProposition 34, California Secretary of State, available at http://vigarchive.
sos.ca.gov/2000/general/text/text-proposed-law-34.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
204. Id.
205. Harllee Branch, Proposition 34: Limits on Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, MCGEORGE
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE REVIEW (2000), available at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Publications/California_
Initiative_Review/Past_Initiatives_(Before_November_2005)/2000_November_Initiatives/Proposition_34.htm)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
206. George Skelton, Proposition 34 Offers Merely a Whiff of Reform, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2000),
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/oct/02/news/mn-30083 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
207. Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195
(E.D. CA 2001).
208. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
209. Infra Part V.A.
210. Infra Part V.A.1.
211. Infra Part V.A.2.
212. Infra Part V.A.3.
213. Infra Part V.A.
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1. Insufficient State Interest
California’s interest in banning lobbyist contributions was stated in the text
214
of Proposition 34: “[t]o reduce the influence of large contributors.” But
reducing influence alone is an insufficient state interest to support a contribution
215
limitation. California’s interest in the ban would have to specifically target acts
of quid pro quo corruption perpetuated by lobbyists to qualify as a sufficient state
216
interest. But the voters did not pass the ban in response to a corruption scandal
217
or any other actual or apparent acts of corruption by lobbyists.
218
Regardless, California’s lobbyists have failed to comply with the ban.
219
Former lawmakers-turned-lobbyists violated the ban, as have lobbyists for
220
simply purchasing refreshments for a political fundraiser. Most notably, the
Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) fined a lobbyist over $100,000 for
221
repeatedly violating the ban by hosting fundraisers for elected state officials.
Despite the ban being violated a handful of times, none of the offending acts
222
involved actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption. At best, the offending acts
223
involved attempts to influence or access elected officials.
The constitutional infirmity of the ban is underscored when its history and its
224
outcomes are compared. The fear of improper influence or access does not give

214. Text of Proposed LawCProposition 34, supra note 203.
215. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450–51 (2014); Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010); Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2015).
216. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 2010).
217. Skelton, supra note 206.
218. See FPPC Summary of Enforcement Decisions (2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (detailing two violations of the ban, FPPC enforcement actions 2011/1119 and 2005/0881, neither
of which involved corruption).
219. Laurel Rosenhall, FPPC Fines Ex-Lawmaker Mike Roos for Improper Contributions, SACRAMENTO
BEE (Nov. 4, 2013), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2013/11/fppc-fines-california-mike-roos-forimproper-campaign-contributions.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
220. In the Matter of McKay Carney, Stipulation, Decision, and Order, FPPC No. 13/1128 (2014).
221. Laurel Rosenhall, Sacramento Lobbyist Kevin Sloat Faces $133,500 FPPC Fine, SACRAMENTO BEE
(Feb. 10, 2014), available at http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2014/02/sacramento-lobbyist-kevinsloat-faces-133500-fppc-fine.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review), and In the Matter of
Kevin Sloat and Sloat Higgins Jensen & Associates, Stipulation, Decision, and Order, FPPC No. 13/1201
(2014).
222. See, e.g., FPPC Summary of Enforcement Decisions (2014) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (detailing two violations of the ban, FPPC enforcement actions 2011/1119 and 2005/0881,
neither of which involved corruption); Rosenhall, FPPC Fines Ex-Lawmaker Mike Roos for Improper
Contributions, supra note 219 (detailing a violation of the ban); In the Matter of McKay Carney, Stipulation,
Decision, and Order, supra note 220 (lobbyist fined for improperly purchasing supplies for a fundraiser); and In
the Matter of Kevin Sloat and Sloat Higgins Jensen & Associates, Stipulation, Decision, and Order, FPPC No.
13/1201 (2014) (lobbyist hosted fundraisers at his home for elected officials but no corruption was found).
223. Rosenhall, Sacramento Lobbyist Kevin Sloat Faces $133,500 FPPC Fine, supra note 221.
224. “That speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that those
officials are corrupt.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
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225

rise to a sufficient state interest to properly limit campaign contributions. The
glaring absence of bribery scandals coupled with the statutory purpose to curb the
226
influence of lobbyists leaves the ban vulnerable to attack.
2. The Ban is Insufficiently Tailored
California’s ban was upheld as narrowly tailored because it allowed
contributions to all candidates except those whom the lobbyist is registered to
lobby, and it could not be temporally-limited due to the year-round nature of the
227
California legislature. The Court found the ban sufficiently narrow even though
228
it could be “more narrowly tailored.” Assuming that California can sufficiently
229
demonstrate the need to ban lobbyist contributions, the ban must not
230
unnecessarily restrict non-corrupt contributions. Contributions that may be
political expressions of personal belief are far less likely to be corrupting than
231
expressions made for professional gain.
The ban’s insufficient tailoring is apparent in its underinclusiveness because
the California Senate adopted additional measures to stymy the influence of
232
lobbyist employers. The Senate adopted a rule that prohibits “[m]embers of the
Senate from soliciting or accepting campaign contributions from lobbyist
employers for the period immediately preceding the passage of the state budget
233
and a 30-day period preceding the end of the legislative session each year.” The
Senate’s rule seems to be working better than the simple ban on lobbyist
234
contributions. During the last 30 days of the 2015 session, the members of the
235
Assembly accepted over $2.4 million in contributions. Members of the Senate
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accepted only $91,000 during the same period (however, they also accepted over
236
$280,000 in the week following the session’s end).
3. The Ban Has Loopholes
California’s ban suffers from a common practical infirmity—loopholes
237
allowing state officeholders to accept contributions for federal elections. State
law on campaign contributions does not control contributions to federal
238
And there is no ban on lobbyist contributions to federal
campaigns.
239
campaigns. Thus, California’s lobbyists are free to contribute to federal
campaigns of state legislators and officials, even if the lobbyist could not
240
contribute to the legislators’ or officials’ state campaigns. Exploiting the
241
loophole is not merely an academic exercise.
While serving in the Assembly, former Assemblymember Brian Nestande
ran for Congress in 2014 and accepted contributions from lobbyists registered to
242
lobby the Assembly. The same occurred when former Assemblymember Jared
243
Huffman ran for Congress in 2012. As California’s Attorney General, Kamala

236.
237.
238.
239.
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Commission to Kelli Medina, Finance Director, Friends of Juan Vargas (Aug. 9, 2005), available at
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Commission to Jonathan Dickinson, Ashburn for Congress Committee (Aug. 20, 2004) available at
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available at http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Misc/pdf.aspx?filingid=1719536&amendid=1 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review), with Contributions to NESTANDE, BRIAN in elections in 2014 (within
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Harris is an elected state officer. Attorney General Harris is running for U.S.
245
Senate in 2016 and has accepted contributions from registered lobbyists. Due to
FECA’s preemptive force, there is no way California can prevent state officials
who are candidates for federal office from accepting contributions from state
246
lobbyists.
B. Correcting the Problems of California’s Ban on Lobbyist Contributions
The district court’s rationale for upholding the ban has been eroded by the
247
shifting tides of the Roberts Court. Following the “one last chance” doctrine,
the Roberts Court could be preparing to refine—and heighten—the scrutiny
248
standard for campaign contribution limits as intimated in McCutcheon. If the
Court heightens the scrutiny standard for campaign contribution limits, then
California’s ban would likely be struck down.
California’s ban on lobbyist contributions has constitutional infirmities and
249
practical infirmities. First, an insufficient state interest justified the ban’s
250
enactment. Second, the ban is not narrowly tailored—it is both overbroad and
251
underinclusive. Finally, the ban is preempted by FECA in some instances,
252
causing quirky loopholes. The first two problems can be corrected by amending
253
254
the statute, and the third must be corrected by Congress.
Using the revised Eddleman test as a guide, California’s ban on lobbyist
campaign contributions could be slightly amended and still pass constitutional
255
muster. Primarily, the state’s interest must be limited to preventing actual or
me?y=2012,2011&f-core=1&f-fc=1&c-t-eid=13008447#[{1|gro=y,d-id (on file with The University of the
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256

apparent quid pro quo corruption. Fortunately and unfortunately, California is
257
not plagued by bribery scandals involving lobbyists. The stated purpose of the
258
ban as passed in Proposition 34 is, therefore, constitutionally infirm.
Additionally, the ban must be more narrowly tailored to not to prevent
lobbyists from engaging in political associations that would not give rise to
259
appearances of corruption. The ban is so ineffective that the Senate had to
260
adopt additional rules to lessen the influence of special interests. The ban
currently covers registered lobbyists, but it could be expanded to include owners
or managers of lobbying firms who are not registered as lobbyists or lobbyists’
261
family members. The ban could also be expanded to prevent lobbyists from
contributing to officials’ campaigns for non-statewide or non-legislative
262
positions.
Specifically, the ban should follow Alaska’s model and include an exception
allowing lobbyists to contribute to any candidate for legislative office for which
263
the lobbyist is eligible to vote. The exception should not include popularly264
elected state officers (e.g., the governor, attorney general, etc.). Allowing
contributions to the legislative candidates in the lobbyists’ home districts is a
sensible balance between the states’ interest and the lobbyists’ freedoms of
265
personal association.
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VI. CONCLUSION
California has a reputation as a national leader in campaign finance ethics
266
reform. But, as zealous good intentions sometimes want to do, California’s
267
reforms go too far and impede individual constitutional rights. California’s ban
on lobbyist contributions goes too far by prohibiting personal political
268
expressions in exchange for a fictitious reduction of special interest influence.
Amending the ban to allow in-district contributions preserves the lobbyist’s
269
opportunity to express personal political speech. The State Senate’s selfimposed blackout on contributions from lobbyist employers shows that the idea
270
of lobbyists-as-corruptors is a red herring. The real corruptors are us, we the
271
people, who hire lobbyists to express our political beliefs and then congratulate
272
ourselves when we deny lobbyists the opportunity to express their own beliefs.
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Harris is an elected state officer. Attorney General Harris is running for U.S.
245
Senate in 2016 and has accepted contributions from registered lobbyists. Due to
FECA’s preemptive force, there is no way California can prevent state officials
who are candidates for federal office from accepting contributions from state
246
lobbyists.
B. Correcting the Problems of California’s Ban on Lobbyist Contributions
The district court’s rationale for upholding the ban has been eroded by the
247
shifting tides of the Roberts Court. Following the “one last chance” doctrine,
the Roberts Court could be preparing to refine—and heighten—the scrutiny
248
standard for campaign contribution limits as intimated in McCutcheon. If the
Court heightens the scrutiny standard for campaign contribution limits, then
California’s ban would likely be struck down.
California’s ban on lobbyist contributions has constitutional infirmities and
249
practical infirmities. First, an insufficient state interest justified the ban’s
250
enactment. Second, the ban is not narrowly tailored—it is both overbroad and
251
underinclusive. Finally, the ban is preempted by FECA in some instances,
252
causing quirky loopholes. The first two problems can be corrected by amending
253
254
the statute, and the third must be corrected by Congress.
Using the revised Eddleman test as a guide, California’s ban on lobbyist
campaign contributions could be slightly amended and still pass constitutional
255
muster. Primarily, the state’s interest must be limited to preventing actual or
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